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Self-Sufficient Inferentialism
ULF HLOBIL1
Abstract: For semantic inferentialists, the basic semantic concept is va-
lidity. An inferentialist theory of meaning should offer an account of the
meaning of “valid.” If one tries to add a validity predicate to one’s object
language, however, one runs into problems like the v-Curry paradox. In
previous work, I presented a validity predicate for a non-transitive logic that
can adequately capture its own meta-inferences. Unfortunately, in that sys-
tem, one cannot show of any inference that it is invalid. Here I extend the
system so that it can capture invalidities.
Keywords: inferentialism, naive validity, v-Curry paradox, non-transitive
consequence, substructural logic
1 Introduction
We want to understand what it means for our sentences to have a certain
content. If our theory of meaning is to be general, it will have to give an
account of the contents of the sentences in which it is formulated. Let’s call
a theory of meaning that does that “self-sufficient.” Such a theory applies to
a formulation of itself.
For representationalist theories of meaning, self-sufficiency requires a
representationalist account of expressions like “is true” or “refers to.” In
Tarski’s (1944, 348) terms, the representationalist needs a “semantically
closed language.” Hence, the liar paradox is a problem that a representation-
alist who claims to offer a self-sufficient account of meaning must address.
For otherwise the representationalist’s theory will be build on a concept of
which it offers no account.
1For helpful discussions and feedback, I would like to thank Lucas Rosenblatt, Andreas
Fjellstad, Eduardo Barrio, Luis Estrada-González, Federico Pailos, Diego Tajer, Robert Bran-
dom, Daniel Kaplan, Shuhei Shimamura, Rea Golan, and the audience at talks in Buenos Aires
(SADAF), Mexico City (UNAM), Lisbon (LANCOG), and, of course, Hejnice, where I pre-
sented versions of this material.
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The inferentialist, however, should not point to this splinter in her rival’s
eye, as there may be a beam in her own eye. For, there is an analogue of
the liar paradox for inferentialist theories of meaning. That is the topic of
this paper. According to inferentialism, what it means for a sentence to
have a certain content is that the sentence plays a particular inferential role
(Brandom, 1994, 2008; Peregrin, 2014; Sellars, 1953, 1974). We can think
of the inferential role of a sentence, S, as two sets of pairs. The first set
contains all and only the pairs 〈X,Y 〉 such that the inference from X and S
to Y is valid, which I will write as X,S ` Y . And the second set contains
all and only the pairs 〈X,Y 〉 such that X ` S, Y .2 So, the inferentialist
explains meaning in terms of validity, which I denote by “`.”3 Hence,
a self-sufficient inferentialist theory of meaning must give an account of
expressions like “is valid” or “`.”
Unfortunately, adding a validity predicate to an object language can
easily lead to triviality. My goal in this paper is to contribute to a self-
sufficient inferentialism by making some progress on how we can save
object language expressions for validity from triviality. In particular, I will
present a logic with a validity predicate that captures the meta-inferences of
that logic while also allowing us to prove that many arguments are invalid.
The paper is structured as follows. I start with a recap of the debate
in Section 2. In Section 3, I present a logic with a validity predicate that
captures this logic’s meta-inferences and proves for all invalid inferences
that don’t contain the validity predicate that they are invalid. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Story So Far
In this section, I recapitulate some problems with validity predicates that
arise if we allow for self-reference. As self-reference is hard to avoid if one
wants to construct a self-sufficient semantic theory (after all, the theory must
apply to itself), I will assume that restricting self-reference is off the table.
2I ignore Language Entry and Departure Transitions here (Sellars, 1974, 423-424).
3Note that since the inferentialist’s notion of validity is wider than logical validity, it will be
no help below to say that there is no problem with logical validity (Field, 2017; Ketland, 2012).
To see that the relevant notion of validity is broader, notice that the consequence relation that the
inferentialist uses is not closed under substitution. It is, e.g., an important part of the meaning
of the atomic sentence “a is pink” that the inference from “a is pink” and “b is crimson” to “b
is darker than a” is valid. You cannot, however, substitute “a is cramine” for “a is pink” salva
consequentia here.
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I use “A” as a canonical name for the sentence A, and “Γ” as a canonical
name for the set Γ, etc. Thus, I assume self-reference by fiat, even without
Gödel-coding.
2.1 The v-Curry Paradox
We want to introduce sentences like V al(Γ,∆) that express that the infer-
ence from Γ to ∆ is valid, i.e. that Γ ` ∆, where Γ and ∆ may be sets
or sentences. What does it take for a predicate to express validity? Beall
and Murzi (2013) suggest that, intuitively, V al must obey so-called validity
detachment (VD) and validity proof (VP):
VD
Γ, V al(Γ,∆)⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
VP
⇒ V al(Γ,∆)
Unfortunately, this yields triviality if we accept contraction and cut. To see
this, let κ be (inter-substitutable with) V al(κ,⊥), and call substituting κ for
V al(κ,⊥) or vice versa “κ-substitution.” We can now reason thus:
VD
κ, V al(κ,⊥)⇒⊥
κ-substitution
κ, κ⇒⊥
contraction
κ⇒⊥
VP
⇒ V al(κ,⊥)
κ-substitution⇒ κ
VD
κ, V al(κ,⊥)⇒⊥
κ-substitution
κ, κ⇒⊥
contraction
κ⇒⊥ cut⇒⊥
Non-transitive theorists, like Ripley (2013), respond to such problems by
rejecting cut. The most popular non-transitive logic is ST (Cobreros, Egré,
Ripley, & van Rooij, 2012, 2013).
2.2 Faithfulness
Barrio, Rosenblatt and Tajer (2017) have criticized the non-transitive ap-
proach by arguing that, whether or not obeying VD and VP is necessary
for expressing validity, it is not sufficient. They suggest a further necessary
condition, which I call “faithfulness.”
Definition 1 Faithfulness: A validity predicate, Val, is faithful just in case
V al(Γ1,∆1), ..., V al(Γn,∆n) ` V al(Θ,Λ) is provable iff Θ ` Λ follows
from Γ1 ` ∆1,...,Γn ` ∆n via a valid meta-inference.
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Barrio, Rosenblatt and Tajer (2017) show that if we add a validity
predicate to ST in the most obvious way, then the validity predicate is not
faithful. I have defended the non-transitive approach against this criticism
in earlier work (Hlobil, 2018b). In this paper, I want to expand on my earlier
response and address a remaining issue.
Faithfulness can be understood in different ways, depending on what we
mean by “valid meta-inference.” We could (a) take a meta-inference to be
valid if it is an instance of an admissible meta-rule, or (b) if it is an instance
of a derivable meta-rule.4 A meta-rule is admissible in a logic L iff, for
all instances, the conclusion-sequent holds in L if all the premise-sequents
hold inL. A meta-rule is derivable in a sequent calculus iff, for all instances,
there is a proof-tree with the conclusion-sequent as its root and all the leaves
being either premise-sequents or axioms of the sequent calculus.
We should adopt option (b) and reject (a). That is because if we adopt
(a), faithfulness yields triviality if the conditional that we use to define
“admissible rule” obeys modus ponens and contraction (in the sense that “if
A, then (if A, then B)" is equivalent to “if A, then B").5 However, modus
ponens and contraction are plausible, and the conditional of ST obeys them.
Hence, advocates of the non-transitive approach should reject (a).
Someone might be tempted to reject the idea that a predicate that ex-
presses validity must be faithful. That, however, is a bad idea for inferen-
tialists. In formulating and using her semantic theory, the inferentialists is
constantly reasoning from premises about validity to conclusion about valid-
ity. If the inferentialist rejects the left-to-right direction of faithfulness, then
she admits that the inferential role—i.e. the meaning—of “valid” is such
that it underwrites inferences that are incorrect, by the standard of what re-
ally follows from what. If the inferentialist rejects the right-to-left direction
of faithfulness, then she holds that “x is valid; therefore, y is valid” may be
correct, by the standard of what actually follows from what, and it may still
4Dicher and Paoli (2019) suggest a notion of local validity of meta-inferences. This notion
is tied to the semantic idea of valuations. I am ignoring it here because of my inferentialist
motivation.
5I showed this in (Hlobil, 2018a). Fjellstad (ms) has developed the following nice presen-
tation of the point: Let κ be the sentence V al(κ, V al(Γ,∆)), where Γ and ∆ are arbitrary.
Assume faithfulness for reductio. (i) By faithfulness, V al(κ, V al(Γ,∆)) ` V al(Γ,∆) is
provable if and only if it is the case that if V al(κ, V al(Γ,∆)) ` V al(Γ,∆), then Γ ` ∆.
(ii) By contraction of the conditional, if V al(κ, V al(Γ,∆)) ` V al(Γ,∆), then Γ ` ∆.
But this is the right-hand-side of (i) above. (iii) So, by modus ponens, V al(κ, V al(Γ,∆))
` V al(Γ,∆). (iv) Since this is the antecedent of (ii), by modus ponens, Γ ` ∆.
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be ruled invalid, by the meaning of the word “valid,” as explained by the in-
ferentialist. Either way, the inferentialist admits that when she describes the
inferential roles of sentences by using “valid,” she is not—by the meaning
of this word (as she explains it)—beholden to what actually follows from
what. But that amounts to admitting that she is not talking about the actual
inferential roles of these sentences. Hence, the inferentialist cannot reject
faithfulness.
2.3 Using Contraction Against VD
Unfortunately, another problem arises: contraction, faithfulness, and VD
jointly yield triviality. To see this, let κ be V al(κ, V al(Γ,∆)). Now:
VD
κ, V al(κ, V al(Γ,∆))⇒ V al(Γ,∆)
κ-substitution
V al(κ, V al(Γ,∆)), V al(κ, V al(Γ,∆))⇒ V al(Γ,∆)
contraction
V al(κ, V al(Γ,∆))⇒ V al(Γ,∆)
κ-substitution
κ⇒ V al(Γ,∆)
By faithfulness, the fact that the third line of this tree is provable tells us
that, by the application of a derivable meta-rule, we can infer Γ ⇒ ∆ from
κ ⇒ V al(Γ,∆). But we have just proven the latter. Hence, there is a way
to continue our proof-tree to reach Γ⇒ ∆.
We are thus forced to choose between VD and contraction. The option
of rejecting contraction is well explored in the literature. I want to look at
rejecting VD. But before we worry about VD, we should ask whether we
can, in fact, get a faithful validity predicate if we reject VD. Fortunately, the
answer is “yes.”
2.4 Assuming Sequents
I showed in (Hlobil, 2018b) how to add a faithful validity predicate to ST by
rejecting VD. I call this extension of ST “NG,” and Fig. 1 gives a variant of
it. I use lower case Latin letters and the subscript “0” on sets (e.g. in Ax1)
for atomic sentences and sets thereof respectively.
If we dropped the VLR rule from NG, we would have a formulation of
ST. And if we also dropped the rules for the truth-predicate, we would have
classical propositional logic (with conjunction and the conditional defined
in the usual way). Notice that weakening is absorbed into the axioms and
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Axioms of NG
Ax1: Γ0, p⇒ p,∆0
Rules of NG
Γ ⇒ A,∆
LN
Γ,¬A⇒ ∆
Γ, A⇒ ∆
RN
Γ ⇒ ¬A,∆
Γ, A⇒ ∆ Γ, B ⇒ ∆
Lv
Γ, A ∨B ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ A,B,∆
Rv
Γ ⇒ A ∨B,∆
Γ, A⇒ ∆
LT
Γ, T r(A) ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ A,∆
RT
Γ ⇒ Tr(A),∆
1: Γ1 ⇒ ∆1
... ...
m: Γm ⇒ ∆m
... applications of rules of NG
Θ ⇒ Λ VLR, [1,...,m]
V al(Γ1,∆1), ..., V al(Γm,∆m) ⇒ V al(Θ,Λ)
Figure 1: System NG
that we assume contraction and permutation, i.e., we work with sets on the
left and the right.
What is special about NG is that we can assume and discharge sequents
by using the VLR-rule. The superscripts that number the assumed sequents
are not part of those sequents; they merely help us to keep track of our
assumptions. We allow empty discharges.
3 Adding Invalidities to NG
The problem with NG that I want to address in this paper is that it cannot
prove of any inference that it is invalid. This is a problem because if the
inferentialist cannot show of any inference that it is invalid, then, for all we
know, the inferential roles of our expressions include any inference you care
to name. And while the meanings of our words may be opaque to us in some
respects, it is implausible that this opacity is so enormous.
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3.1 Formulating STV
To address this problem, I want to see how we might extend NG so that
we can prove some invalidities. Let’s call this extension STV. Ideally the
proofs of invalidity in STV should mirror our meta-theoretic knowledge of
invalidities in STV. After all, we want to give a treatment, in the object
language, of our use of “`” in the meta-language. So we should begin
by asking ourselves how we usually know about invalidities. For standard
sequent calculi, we usually know about invalidities by observing that a root-
first proof search fails. My strategy here is to mimic such proof-searches
within STV.
At the level of atomic sequents, we perform a root-first proof search
simply by seeing whether the sequent has the form of an axiom. To mirror
this within STV, let’s add the following axioms:
Ax2 If Γ0 ∩∆0 = ∅ and neither Val nor Tr occur in Γ0 ∪∆0,
then V al(Γ0,∆0)⇒ is an axiom.
With these axioms we can prove of any V al-free and Tr-free, atomic
sequent that is not an axiom of ST that it is invalid. After all, for any
atomic sequent, Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, that is not of the form of Ax1, Ax2 gives us
V al(Γ0,∆0)⇒, and by RN we get⇒ ¬V al(Γ0,∆0).
Next we observe that the notion of a valid meta-inference used in faith-
fulness builds in transitivity. We reason transitively in our sequent calculus,
and the notion of a valid meta-inference must respect this transitivity of our
meta-theoretic reasoning. It does that by relying on the notion of a derivable
meta-rule, which cares only about the leaves and the root of a proof-tree and
not about the lemmas that must be established in the proof-tree along the
way. Let’s make this feature of our meta-theoretical reasoning explicit at
the object-level of STV by adding the following restricted cut rule.
If the principal operator of every sentence in Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ Λ ∪ Θ is V al
and there are no open assumptions, we can apply the rule:
Γ ⇒ ∆, V al(Φ,Ψ) V al(Φ,Ψ),Λ ⇒ Θ
Val-Cut
Γ,Λ ⇒ ∆,Θ
We say that a proof-tree of STV is closed iff all undischarged sequents are
axioms of STV. A sequent, Γ⇒ ∆, is provable in STV (for which we write
Γ `STV ∆) iff there is a closed proof-tree of NG that has the sequent as its
root.
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3.2 Validity and Invalidity in STV
The validity predicate of STV captures all the validities and invalidities of
ST. For the validities, it is easy to see that STV captures all of its own
validities, which include all ST validities.
Proposition 1 If Γ `STV ∆, then `STV V al(Γ,∆).
Proof. Suppose that Γ `STV ∆ and, hence, Γ ⇒STV ∆ is the root of a
closed proof-tree. By VRL, ⇒STV V al(Γ,∆) can be proved in a closed
proof-tree. Therefore, `STV V al(Γ,∆).
For the invalidities, note that I take the language of ST, LST , to not
include the validity predicate. The validity predicate of STV captures all ST
invalidities in LST .
Proposition 2 If Γ 6`ST ∆ and Γ ∪∆ ∈ LST , then `STV ¬V al(Γ,∆).
Proof. Suppose that Γ 6`ST ∆ and Val does not occur in Γ ∪ ∆. So there
is no proof-tree in ST with Γ ⇒ST ∆ as its root. Hence, a root-first proof
search (in which we forbid loops and bottom-to-top rule applications) for
Γ⇒ST ∆ will result in a tree with at least one leave Θ0 ⇒ST Λ0 such that
Θ0 ∩Λ0 = ∅ (and hence Θ0 6`ST Λ0). Since Θ0 ∩Λ0 = ∅ and Val does not
occur in Θ0 ∪Λ0, we have V al(Θ0,Λ0)⇒STV by Ax2. Since all the rules
of ST are invertible, the inverse of the path from Θ0 ⇒ST Λ0 to Γ⇒ST ∆
is a derivable rule application in ST and, hence, in STV. Call this derivable
rule DERIV. We can now reason thus:
1: Γ ⇒ ∆
DERIV
Θ0 ⇒ Λ0
VLR,[1]
V al(Γ,∆) ⇒ V al(Θ0,Λ0) V al(Θ0,Λ0) ⇒
Val-Cut
V al(Γ,∆) ⇒
RN
⇒ ¬V al(Γ,∆)
This proof-tree does not have any open assumptions. Therefore, `STV
¬V al(Γ,∆).
I will show below that the converses of both propositions also hold and,
hence, that the validity predicate of STV (applied to sentences of LST )
strongly represents ST-validity.6
6To be explicit,R(x, y) strongly represents relationR(x, y) in STV iff (i) [`STV R(x, y)
iff R(x, y)] and (ii) [`STV ¬R(x, y) iff not R(x, y)].
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Before we turn to that, however, notice that if STV doesn’t prove the
empty sequent, there must be “validity-gaps,” i.e., there must be inferences
such that STV proves neither that they are valid nor that they are invalid.
Proposition 3 If ∅ 6`STV ∅, then there are some sets, Γ,∆, such that
neither `STV V al(Γ,∆) nor `STV ¬V al(Γ,∆).
Proof. By example. Let κ = V al(κ, ∅). Suppose we had `STV ¬κ and
hence κ⇒STV . By VLR, we would get⇒STV κ. And Val-Cut would then
yield the empty sequent. Similarly, if we had ⇒STV κ, then faithfulness
(which I will prove below) would give us κ⇒STV , and this would yield the
empty sequent.
I will now show that STV doesn’t prove the empty sequent. We will first
need to establish the following lemma, which will also make it easy to see,
along the way, that the validity predicate of STV is faithful.
Lemma 1 If V al(Γ1,∆1), ..., V al(Γn,∆n)⇒ V al(Θ1,Λ1), ..., V al(Θm,
Λm) is provable in STV, then, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m , the sequent V al(Γ1,
∆1), ..., V al(Γn,∆n)⇒ V al(Θi,Λi) is provable in a proof-tree where the
root comes by VLR.
Proof. We argue by induction on proof-height. Suppose the lemma holds
for sequents provable in trees strictly lower than k. A proof of height k of a
target sequent must come by VLR, Ax1, a bottom-to-top rule, or Val-Cut.
If it comes by VLR, we are done. If it comes by Ax1, then the left and the
right share a sentence. So, for some 1 ≤ l ≤ n, Γl = Θi and ∆l = Λi. We
assume Θi ⇒ Λi and immediately use VLR, discharging, for all 1 ≤ r ≤ n
(vacuously except for r = l), the assumptions Θr ⇒ Λr. We thus prove
V al(Γ1,∆1), ..., V al(Γn,∆n)⇒ V al(Θi,Λi) by VLR.
If the target sequent comes by a bottom-to-top rule application, the
premise sequent must include a sentence, A, whose principal connective is
not Val. The premise of that must come by a top-to-bottom application of the
same rule or by Val-Cut. If it comes by the top-to-bottom rule application,
we apply our hypothesis to the premise of that step and we are done. If
it comes by Val-Cut, the same reasoning applies to the premise of Val-Cut
that contains A. The premise either comes by introducing A or by Val-Cut.
If the first, we can eliminate this introduction and subsequent elimination.
If the second, the same reasoning applies again. The chain of Val-Cut
applications must end because the leaves of proof-trees contain only finitely
many sentences.
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If the root comes by Val-Cut, our two premise-sequents are V al(Γ1,
∆1), ..., V al(Γx,∆x) ⇒ V al(Θ1,Λ1), ..., V al(Θy,Λy), V al(Ξ,Π) and
V al(Ξ,Π), V al(Γx+1,∆x+1) ,..., V al(Γn, ∆n)⇒ V al(Θy+1,Λy+1), ...,
V al(Θm, Λm), for some renumbering (and perhaps doubling) of the Γs, ∆s,
Θs, and Λs in the target sequent.
By our induction hypothesis, for both sequents, a sequent like it with all
but one sentence on the right deleted can be proven via VLR. Now, if for the
first sequent the remaining sentence on the right is not V al(Ξ,Π), then we
get the desired result by adding some empty discharges. So let’s assume that
we can prove V al(Γ1,∆1),..., V al(Γx,∆x) ⇒ V al(Ξ,Π) via VLR. Then
there is a proof-tree starting with (some of) the sequents that correspond to
the sentences on the left and with a root that corresponds to the sentence on
the right. Moreover, from the second premise of our Val-Cut application, we
know that, for some s, (y+1) ≤ s ≤ m, and V al(Ξ,Π), V al(Γx+1,∆x+1)
,..., V al(Γn, ∆n) ⇒ V al(Θs,Λs) is derivable via VLR. Thus, there is a
corresponding proof-tree with the sequents on the left as assumed leaves.
We can combine the two proof-trees to get one proof-tree in which Θs ⇒ Λs
is derived from the assumptions Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, ..., Γn ⇒ ∆n, where Ξ ⇒ Π is
the root of a subproof with leaves Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, ..., Γx ⇒ ∆x.
With this lemma in hand, it is easy to show that the validity predicate of
STV is faithful.
Theorem 1 The validity predicate of STV is faithful, i.e., V al(Γ1,∆1),...,
V al(Γn,∆n) ⇒ V al(Θ,Λ) is provable in STV iff there is a proof-tree in
STV with Θ ⇒ Λ as its root and (some of) Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, ..., Γn ⇒ ∆n as its
leaves, i.e., this is an application of a derivable rule.
Proof. The left-to-right direction is immediate from VLR. The right-to-left
direction is immediate from Lemma 1.
We can now establish that STV does not prove the empty sequent. And
as we have already seen above, this implies that STV does not prove all of
its own invalidities.
Lemma 2 STV does not prove the empty sequent, i.e. ∅ 6`STV ∅.
Proof. The empty sequent can only come by Val-Cut. The premise-sequents
are ⇒ V al(Γ,∆) and V al(Γ,∆) ⇒. By Lemma 1, the first premise is
provable via VLR. Hence, Γ ⇒ ∆ is provable. However, V al(Γ,∆) ⇒ is
provable only if a root-first proof search for Γ⇒ ∆ fails. Thus, there would
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have be atomic sets Γ0 and ∆0 such that Γ0 ⇒ ∆0 and V al(Γ0,∆0) ⇒.
The first has to come by Ax1 and the second by Ax2. Because of the former,
Γ0∩∆0 6= ∅. But that means that V al(Γ0,∆0)⇒ cannot come by Ax2.
It follows that there is no inference such that STV proves that the
inference is valid and also proves that it is invalid.
Corollary 1 There are no Γ,∆, such that⇒ V al(Γ,∆) and V al(Γ,∆)⇒.
As already intimated, however, Lemma 2, together with, Proposition 3
also implies:
Proposition 4 There are some sets, Γ,∆, such that neither `STV V al(Γ,∆)
nor `STV ¬V al(Γ,∆).
In other words, STV doesn’t decide all questions about validity. In
particular, as we have seen in the proof of Proposition 3, STV shows neither
that what the v-Curry sentence says is true, namely that the empty set
follows validly from it, nor that it is false.
We have seen above that STV proves all the validities and invalidities of
ST. We can now show the converse as well.
Lemma 3 If `STV V al(Γ,∆) and Γ ∪∆ is Val-free, then Γ `ST ∆.
Proof. Suppose that ⇒STV V al(Γ,∆) and Γ ∪ ∆ is Val-free. Our root
must have come by VLR. So, Γ ⇒STV ∆ is provable. Since this does not
contain Val, it cannot come by VLR or Val-Cut. So it must come by one
of the ST-rules. This applies to all the premise sequents and, repeating the
reasoning, to all sequents in the proof-tree. Hence, Γ `ST ∆.
Theorem 2 The STV validity predicate, applied to ST sentences, strongly
represents ST validity, i.e., for all Γ ∪ ∆ ⊆ LST , we have, first, that
`STV V al(Γ,∆) iff Γ `ST ∆; and, second, that `STV ¬V al(Γ,∆) iff
Γ 6`ST ∆.
Proof. The right-to-left directions of the two biconditionals are Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 above. The left-to-right direction of the first biconditional is
Proposition 3. For the left-to-right direction of the second biconditional, we
prove the contrapositive. Suppose that Γ `ST ∆. We know that this im-
plies `STV V al(Γ,∆). Assume for reductio that `STV ¬V al(Γ,∆). That
would mean that V al(Γ,∆) `STV . But this is ruled out by Corollary 1.
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Let’s take stock. The validity predicate of STV is faithful, and it captures
the validities and invalidities of ST (over a V al-free language) perfectly.
Moreover, STV doesn’t prove of any inference that it is valid and also that it
is invalid. However, there are some inferences for which STV proves neither
that they are valid nor that they are invalid.
3.3 STV Embeds LP in ST
There is another perspective on the results above that is worth mentioning. It
is well-known that LP is the external logic of ST (Barrio, Pailos, & Szmuc,
2019; Barrio, Rosenblatt, & Tajer, 2015; Dicher & Paoli, 2019; Pynko,
2010). That is (Barrio et al., 2015, 557):
Fact 1 Let t be a translation function such that t(Γ⇒ ∆) = ∧Γ ⊃ ∨∆
and t(⇒ ∆) = ∨∆. Then an ST-meta-inference is admissible iff its t-
translation is LP-valid, i.e., Θ `ST Λ whenever Γ1 `ST ∆1,...,Γn `ST ∆n
holds if and only if t(Γ1 ⇒ ∆1), ...,t(Γn ⇒ ∆n) `LP t(Θ⇒ Λ).
So, from an ST-perspective, LP tells us how to reason with claims about
validity, i.e., with sequents. The validity predicate of STV allows us to
codify this reasoning not at the meta-inferential level of STV but at the
inferential level. In particular, for any inference that is LP-valid, we can
translate the sentences that occur in it (using the inverse of t) into sequents
of ST and, then, into a V al-sentences of STV. The resulting inference is
either STV-valid or STV proves the negation of one of the premises, i.e.:
Proposition 5 t(Γ1 ⇒ ∆1), ...,t(Γn ⇒ ∆n) `LP t(Θ ⇒ Λ) if and
only if either V al(Γ1,∆1), ..., V al(Γn,∆n) `STV V al(Θ,Λ) or, for some
1 ≤ i ≤ n, `STV ¬V al(Γi,∆i), where Γ1, ...,Γn,∆1, ...,∆n,Θ, and Λ
are V al-free.
Proof. Left-to-right: Suppose that t(Γ1 ⇒ ∆1), ...,t(Γn ⇒ ∆n) `LP
t(Θ ⇒ Λ). By Fact 1, either one of Γ1 `ST ∆1,...,Γn `ST ∆n fails
or Θ `ST Λ holds. If the latter, then `STV V al(Θ,Λ) and we can
prove this via VLR. Adding vacuous discharges we can hence also prove:
V al(Γ1,∆1), ..., V al(Γn,∆n) `STV V al(Θ,Λ). If the former, i.e. Γi 6`ST
∆i, then by Proposition 2, `STV ¬V al(Γi,∆i).
Right-to-left: If, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, `STV ¬V al(Γi,∆i), then, by
Theorem 2, Γi 6`ST ∆i. Hence, Θ `ST Λ whenever Γ1 `ST ∆1,...,Γn `ST
∆n. So, by Fact 1, t(Γ1 ⇒ ∆1), ...,t(Γn ⇒ ∆n) `LP t(Θ ⇒ Λ).
For the other disjunct, suppose that V al(Γ1,∆1), ..., V al(Γn,∆n) `STV
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V al(Θ,Λ). By faithfulness, Θ⇒ Λ follows in ST via a derivable meta-rule
from Γ1 ⇒ ∆1,...,Γn ⇒ ∆n. So, whenever we have Γ1 `ST ∆1,...,Γn `ST
∆n, we also have Θ `ST Λ. Therefore, by Fact 1, t(Γ1 ⇒ ∆1), ...,t(Γn
⇒ ∆n) `LP t(Θ⇒ Λ).
This allows us to view LP as a theory that describes how we should
reason with sentences about validity. Given that MP fails in LP, the failure
of VD in STV can no longer surprise us. The advocate of STV can see LP
as merely a disguised formulation of the logic of validity claims.
4 Conclusion
I have presented a way to add to ST a validity predicate that captures the
derivable meta-inference of the resulting logic and strongly represents ST-
validity over the V al-free fragment of the language. Where does that leave
us with respect to a self-sufficient inferentialism?
No doubt STV falls short of providing a fully satisfactory account of
the meaning of “valid,” as this term is used by the inferentialist. It has at
least three serious limitations. First, STV is propositional. And since the
usual sequent rules for the quantifiers are not invertible, it is not obvious
how the method for proving invalidities presented here could be extended
to first-order invalidities. Second, STV deems some inferences invalid
without proving, in the object language, that they are invalid, e.g., the
inference from the v-Curry sentence to an absurd conclusion. This is an
aspect of the inferential role of “valid,” as used by the inferentialist who
puts forward STV, about which her inferentialist account of “V al” is silent.
Third, in proving things about STV the inferentialist makes use of powerful
mathematical machinery, e.g., in proofs by induction. But there is no analog
of that machinery at the object level of STV.
On the other hand, STV provides a model of what are arguably the
two basic ways of knowing about validities and invalidities respectively,
given an inferentialist perspective in a sequent calculus setting. We know
about validities via proofs, and we know about invalidities via failed root-
first proof-searches. STV offers an account of the use of “valid” in these
activities. That brings the inferentialist a step closer to an account of her use
of “valid” in stating her theory. Further steps will have to wait for another
occasion.
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